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The planned size and structure of the Navy has changed several times over the last 
20 years, largely as a result of the end of the Cold War.  During the Cold War years of the 
1980s, the Reagan Administration planned a Navy of about 600 ships, including 15 
aircraft carriers, 242 surface combatants, and 100 nuclear-powered attack submarines.  In 
the initial post-Cold War years of 1991-1992, the former Bush Administration, as part of 
its “Base Force” plan for future U.S. military forces, planned a Navy of more than 400 
ships, including 12 aircraft carriers, about 145 surface combatants, and 80 attack 
submarines (later adjusted to about 55 attack submarines).  The Clinton Administration, 
as part of its 1993 Bottom-Up Review (BUR) of U.S. military forces, planned a Navy of 
346 ships, including 12 carriers (11 operational carriers and 1 operational/reserve training 
carrier), about 124 surface combatants, and 45 to 55 attack submarines.  Following the 
1997 Quadrennial Defense Review, the Clinton Administration planned a Navy of about 
305 ships, including 12 carriers, 116 surface combatants, and 50 attack submarines. 
After years of struggling to attract recruits and retain sailors, the Navy now has 
the opposite problem: too many people.  In December 2003, almost 400 junior officers, 
including recent graduates of the Naval Academy, were told that their services were no 
longer needed.  The get-tough approach to reduce the ranks also has affected senior 
enlisted sailors, who are finding themselves pushed into early retirement if they don't 
advance fast enough [Ref. 1]. 
The Department of Defense (DOD) has used separations as the primary tool in 
reducing the number of personnel in the military when the actual size of the force has 
outgrown the perceived needs of the military.  This is often the result of the geo-political 
situation, and can also be the result of changes in the U.S. economy. The three key tasks 
of force sizing are [Ref. 2: p. 2]:  
determination of force levels needed to achieve objectives with some knowledge 
of the likelihood of success or risk of failure; 
• 
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assessment of how the force is to be postured within the proposed military 
strategy; 
• 
• demonstrating the validity of the determinations of force levels and their planned 
use to key congressional committees and the public. 
There are two aims of separations.  The first aim is to shape the force to meet the 
nation’s needs.  The other aim is to reduce the economic burdens that a large military 
places on the resources of a state.  Separations have met the overarching goal of shaping 
the force, specifically at the mid-career level.  A closer analysis is necessary to discover 
how effective separations have been from a financial perspective. 
The purpose of this thesis is to determine the effectiveness of past separation pay 
programs.  Specifically, the research focuses on the purpose of the specific programs, the 
methodology of each program, and evaluates the costs and time to reach a desired end 
state.  The results of this study should be of benefit to Navy manpower and budget 
planners as the Navy prepares to reduce manning levels.  Furthermore, the results should 
illustrate which programs or components of past programs were most efficient in 
achieving the Navy’s goals, and help to develop force-shaping tools of the future. 
 
B. NEED FOR SEPARATIONS 
1. Historical Need 
Few, if any, organizational structures have had as much experience with 
downsizing as the United States military.  Downsizing, or demobilization, has been a 
familiar aspect of national security policy over nearly the past century and a half [Ref. 
3:pp. 221-232].  Military leaders must develop practices of force reduction, survive 
dramatically reduced budgets, and cope with the subsequent demands of very rapid 
organizational growth.  
Expansion and contraction have been two of the defining characteristics of 
military policy.  A historic case in point followed World War II.  Within a two-year 
period, 1945 to 1947, personnel were reduced from 12 million to just over 1.5 million.  
The basic combat division structure was effectively eliminated rather than maintained at 
lower levels of staffing and diminished readiness (which would have allowed for 
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reactivation at some later point).  At the war’s end there were 91 Army and six Marine 
divisions; by 1947 there were ten Army and two Marine divisions, all of reduced 
strength. Similarly, there were sharp reductions in the other services–for the Navy, from 
8,165 to 1,003 ships; for the Air Force, from 218 to 38 groups [Ref. 4:p. 75]. 
The late 1980s and the 1990s comprised a period of unprecedented rapid and 
fundamental change.  Although the end of the Cold War in 1989 and the breakup of the 
Soviet Union in 1991 are factors that led to force reductions, these events were not the 
leading factors.  The DOD started downsizing in 1987.  Troop reductions came about due 
to the growing pressure to hold defense spending in check.  This led two services, the 
Army and the Air Force, to begin downsizing moderately and internally in 1987.  One of 
the first groups targeted was commissioned service members, in response to 
congressional attention directed at what the legislative body perceived as a bloated officer 
corps.  The Marine Corps began to grow smaller in 1988.  The Navy did not start 
declining in number until 1990.  Its delay in carrying out personnel cuts was due to the 
fact that it had been pursuing a major program to build up to a fleet of 600 ships.  In the 
late 1980s, the service still did not have the sailors it needed to crew a fleet of that size 
[Ref. 5:p. 1]. 
Historically, conscription was used to increase the size of the force as needed.  
During this period, large-scale force reductions occurred following the conclusion of a 
war or major conflict.  Following the conflict, when the large force was no longer needed, 
reducing the number of personnel drafted shaped the force, and by releasing those drafted 
who wished to return home.  These methods of reducing end strength could not work in 
the era of the all-volunteer force (AVF). 
The task of separating personnel is made even more difficult when separating 
members of an AVF.  The AVF and the associated set of personnel and compensation 
policies implemented to make it succeed made the force reduction in the early 1990s 
different and more difficult than previous major military drawdowns.  Policies were 
developed to attract and retain high quality personnel.  These policies included high 
levels of compensation, substantial reenlistment bonuses, and higher educational 
opportunities.  Ironically, the success of these policies could result in the need for further 
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reductions.  The AVF consists of individuals who have voluntarily chosen military 
service by enlisting, many of whom have planned for long military careers coupled with 
military retirement.  
Military manpower planners must focus their attention on developing a separation 
program that includes a set of compensation incentives particularly suited for the AVF.  
These programs should reach end strength goals while being equitable, fiscally prudent, 
and taking into account the career expectations of the personnel who voluntarily enlisted. 
Separation programs must be evaluated for a range of criteria that include not 
only the usual cost and efficiency concerns but also considerations of equitable treatment 
for those staying and those leaving under alternative compensation plans, namely, 
involuntary separation and normal retirement.  Consistency should exist within these 
approaches.  That is, compensation for involuntary separation should not be greater than 
that for voluntary departure.  The plan must also take account of the potential for hasty or 
unwise decisions by military personnel and the possibility of later regret by those who 
accept lump-sum payments.  Lastly, an important part of cost considerations is the fact 
that reasonably structured separation offers will result in significant net present value 
savings to the government from avoidance of future retirement costs.  Thus, any plan 
must contain provisions for recognizing these long-term savings within the DOD budget 
and the Congressional/Administration budget [Ref. 6:p. xiv]. 
Draft-era force reduction methods did not equitably consider career expectations.  
While cutting accessions may seem like an easy quick solution to the problem, it is not 
feasible.  Cutting accessions to draw the size of the military down, causes cyclical 
changes in the experience level of those who remain in service.  This can lead to having 
to assign a senior person to a job that is below his/her skill level.  Also, as these senior 
personnel retire, they are being replaced by junior personnel that may not have attained 
the experience or skill needed to perform in their new roles.  This cyclical change in 
experience could have a negative result on readiness.  These additional restraints imposed 
on military planners force the need to develop new programs.  
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After looking at the task ahead of them, military leaders realized that it would be 
very hard to develop a program that would meet all of the constraints while satisfying the 
number of people that need to leave the service.  In an effort to effectively deal with the 
constraints, military leaders developed several plans to shape the force.  All of the 
programs conformed to the constraints; however, the incentives included in the different 
programs appealed to different members.  By varying the incentives among the programs, 
military leaders hoped to entice personnel at different points in their careers, with 
different skill and experience levels, to leave the service. 
2. Present Need 
The Navy views “people” as its biggest expense. Of the Navy’s approximately 
$119 billion budget for 2005, about $37 billion goes to personnel costs, and $35 billion to 
operations and maintenance.  To meet growing demands for U.S. maritime presence 
around the world and adequately support the war-fighting regional commanders, the 
Navy says it needs more ships, but fewer sailors.  The desired expansion of the fleet—
from 292 to about 375 ships—would be financed largely with cutbacks in personnel. 
Although the Defense Department has not endorsed the Navy’s 375-ship goal, the 
expectation is that the Pentagon would not object, if the Navy paid for the additional 
ships with internal savings, without seeking significantly larger shipbuilding budgets.  
Those internal savings only can be attained, officials said, by reducing the number of 
people in the Navy.  The Navy plans to reduce the rolls by 7,900 active duty personnel in 
fiscal year 2005, with a year-end goal of 365,900 [Ref. 7]. 
 
C. THESIS OBJECTIVES 
This research analyzes the costs and benefits of various options for voluntarily 
separating members from the Navy.  The first part of this research will describe the 
historical experience with Voluntary Separation Incentive (VSI), Special Separation 
Bonus (SSB), Temporary Early Retirement Authority (TERA), and involuntary 
separation pay.  Drawing on this background, alternative separation pay options that draw 
on recent market design research are proposed. 
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D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The questions that must be answered in order to reach the desired objectives are: 
• How effective have the past separation pay programs been in achieving the end 
strength goals? 
• Have the costs associated with the past programs outweighed the benefits? 
• Does the need for separation pay programs still exist? 
• Will the separation pay programs of the past work today? 
• Is there a need to develop new separation pay programs? 
 
E. SCOPE OF THESIS 
In analyzing the various separation programs, data from the period that the 
programs existed are used.  When comparing programs from different time periods, 
current year dollars are used.  The data that are used will quantify the programs.  The 
goal of this thesis is not a qualitative analysis of specific programs.  I am not interested in 
why certain individuals chose one program over another.  This research will focus 
primarily on the financial impact of separation programs.  The results of this research 
should provide insight into the efficiency and effectiveness of past programs and help 
planners to develop programs that will meet future needs. 
 
F. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
Chapter I provides a basis for the study by outlining the scope and methodology 
for conducting the analysis to answer the research questions. 
Chapter II provides a detailed view of past separation programs.  A history of past 
force shaping programs is included.  This chapter explains the situation that led to the 
need for separations in a specific time frame, the goal of the program, and the benefits 
associated with that program.  Also, unique characteristics of each program are explained 
in detail. 
Chapter III gives an overview of the current retirement system.  An understanding 
of this system is important because it is the benchmark to which all of the separation 
programs in this thesis are compared. 
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Chapter IV presents the information that was gathered through research on the 
different separation programs.  An extensive analysis of each program’s structure and 
methods was conducted.  This analysis explains how specific programs attempted to meet 
the needs of the military while working within the relevant constraints.  The results were 
used to determine overall effectiveness of the program.  
Chapter V contains a qualitative analysis of the data that were presented in 
Chapter IV. All of the research questions are answered and conclusions based on the data 























A. HISTORICAL LOOK AT SEPARATIONS 
Military doctrine, force requirements and threat scenarios are the major 
contributing factors that determine the size of the military force.  Major global events that 
change the U.S. security environment affect the balance between the contributing factors 
and force size.  Such events may change or make obsolete threat scenarios, leading to 
modifications in force requirements and military doctrine.  
For forty years the principal threat to the U.S. never changed.  There were cyclical 
changes of human resources and war materiel focused against that threat over the 
decades.  The Reagan buildup of American military forces in the 1980s represented the 
last quantitative high point in DOD in terms of human resources and materiel.  In 
reviewing what transpired during the last wave of downsizing, it is important to note the 


































Figure 1.   DOD Manpower Totals 
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This provides a starting point for the analysis.  The year 1987 was not only the 
peak of the Reagan expansion, but it also saw the initial signs of an impending decline in 
military resources [Ref. 5:p. 5]. 
The Navy was composed of 586,841 sailors in 1987.  Although this was the 
largest number of active-duty since 1972, the post-Vietnam peak would not be reached 
until two years later.  In 1989 the Navy would top out at 592,652 [Ref. 8:p. 17].  Force 
projection units consisted of 14 aircraft carriers in 1987.  There were 3 battle ships, 36 
cruisers, 69 destroyers and 115 frigates in the fleet.  Attack submarines numbered 102. 
That year the Navy owned 752 fighter/attack platforms organized into 67 squadrons [Ref. 
9].  
One of the major undertakings during the Reagan buildup was the development of 
a 600-ship Navy.  The year 1987 would find the Navy at its closest point to becoming the 
600-ship sea service that had been a DOD goal.  The total of active ships reached 594 that 
year.  Although the members of congress were well aware the Navy needed more 
commissioned personnel to fill positions in the new ships being built for the 600-ship 
fleet, they took a long hard look at the size of the officer corps.  The service was 
compelled to involuntarily transfer 100 officers to inactive duty in September 1987.  This 
was part of its effort to stay within an officer ceiling of 72,051 for the end of the fiscal 
year.  
The 1991 Defense Authorization Act was a result of Congressional pressure to 
reduce defense spending coupled with the collapse of the Soviet Union and a diminished 
need for a large standing military force.  This act directed DOD to reduce active duty 
strength by 400,000 by FY 1995, a 25% reduction.  To maintain a balanced force, 
reductions would have to come from every experience level, including career personnel 
not yet vested in the military retirement system, which “cliff vests” at twenty years of 
service.  Military personnel must have at least twenty years of service to be eligible for 
retirement. Those personnel who exit the service before accruing twenty years of service 
are not eligible for retirement pay and/or benefits. Congress also directed that involuntary 
separations of career members be minimized. 
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1. Involuntary Programs  
Involuntary separations can easily meet any numerical end strength.  The major 
drawbacks to large-scale involuntary separations are:  
1. devastating effects on the morale of remaining members;  
2. increased future recruiting challenges; and  
3. negative public perceptions, especially if senior personnel are adversely affected.  
Additionally, large-scale involuntary separations are against congressional 
mandate.  The monetary separation payments granted to personnel who involuntarily 
separate under honorable conditions do little to minimize these effects.  These programs 
fall short of providing equitable compensation for the loss of pension benefits for the 
majority of individuals [Ref. 10:p. 5].  Involuntary separations become harder to accept 
as career oriented personnel get closer to retirement. 
 
2. Force Shaping Programs 
a. ENCORE  
The Enlisted Navy Career Objectives for Reenlistment (ENCORE) 
program was an effective force-shaping tool.  This program focused specifically on first 
term personnel.  ENCORE offered personnel the opportunity to convert to under 
populated ratings or occupations.  Those personnel who did not want to convert were 
separated.  The program was successful at filling historically undermanned ratings.  
Another benefit of this program was that it increased promotion opportunities for those 
who transferred to new ratings, and those who were in the transferees’ previous rating. 
 
b. High Year Tenure 
The Navy has been successful in recruiting and retention efforts.  An 
unintended consequence of this success has been that the force has come close to the 
maximum end strength allowed by law.  This validates the need for force shaping tools.  
One such tool is mandatory High Year Tenure (HYT).  HYT precludes stagnation within 
the pay grades, ensures upward mobility for advancement, and provides for “force-
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freshening”.  HYT identifies the maximum number of years that enlisted members of a 
certain pay grade may remain in the service prior to mandatory separation.  HYT limits 
were adjusted in 1994 to reflect the need to downsize the force.  The limits have been 
adjusted as necessary over the years to shape the force, and were last changed in July 
2002. 
 
E-4 E-5 E-6 E-7 E-8 E-9
1993 10 20 23 26 28 30
1994 10 20 20 24 26 30
2002 12 20 22 24 26 30
2003 10 20 20 24 26 30
HYT Years by PaygradeFiscal Year
 
Table 1.   High Year Tenure Adjustments by Paygrade (FY 93-43 and 02-03) 
 
c. Selective Early Retirement  
Selective Early Retirement (SER) boards have also been used to influence 
retention behavior.  SER is an involuntary program that targets retirement eligible 
officers.  A regular active-duty officer may be considered for selective early retirement 
by a selection board if the officer is described in any of the following subparagraphs:   
• An officer holding the regular grade of commander who has failed to 
select for promotion to the grade of captain two or more times and whose 
name is not on a list of officers recommended for promotion. 
• An officer holding the regular grade of captain who has served at least 
four years of active duty in that grade and whose name is not on a list of 
officers recommended for promotion. 
• An officer holding the regular grade of rear admiral (lower half) who has 
served at least three and one-half years of active duty in that grade and 
whose name is not on a list of officers recommended for promotion. 
• An officer holding the regular grade of rear admiral who has served at 
least three and one-half years of active duty in that grade.  
A selection board will convene, and may recommend anyone who meets 
the above criteria for early retirement [Ref. 11:]. 
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d. Perform to Serve 
Perform to Serve (PTS) was implemented in March 2003.  The program is 
designed to identify first-term enlisted personnel in overmanned ratings, and encourage 
them to transfer to undermanned ratings.  Personnel should provide three rating choices 
(for which they qualify) to maximize their career opportunities.  Additionally, the 
conversion process is streamlined by removing requirements to submit a separate 
conversion package.  In order to broaden qualification for rating entry and maximize 
sailor choice, Armed Service Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) retesting is 
encouraged. The difference between ENCORE and PTS is that ENCORE was a 
downsizing tool, and PTS is a force-shaping tool. 
 
B. DESIRED CRITERIA OF SEPARATION PROGRAMS 
Separation programs should be designed with a pre-defined end state.  That end 
state is usually a hard number.  With that in mind, these programs are, by design, 
temporary.  Once the end state is met, the program either goes away, or remains on the 
books for later use.  This end state needs to be clearly defined and articulated so that there 
is no ambiguity involved. 
Once the need to reduce the force has been identified, the individual services must 
be granted the authority to specify occupation and grade levels of those eligible for 
voluntary separations.  It is better for the services to identify criteria for personnel, 
because a “cookie cutter” approach will not be all things for all services.  One branch 
may have a disproportionately large population in one particular occupation.  If just that 
occupation were targeted by all services, then the end goal would not be met.  Thus, the 
services need the authority to ensure that quality and skill mix of personnel leaving is 
controlled.  This authority, along with the clearly defined end state, will enable the 
services to prevent the exodus of large numbers of highly qualified personnel, or those 
who have high replacement costs.  
To maintain appropriate future experience profiles in the force, the military 
services need to achieve separations by years of service (YOS) in certain ratings.  These 
numerical targets by YOS are another component in designing separation offers.  The 
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military services must maintain a highly ready and capable force during and after the 
drawdown and must target voluntary separation offers so that they maintain the desired 
mix of occupational experience and higher-quality service members. 
Another approach to reaching end strength numbers is to target occupational 
specialties.  Other things equal, occupations with lower training costs should be targeted 
more heavily than those with higher training costs.  By the same reasoning, occupations 
with longer curves to achieve high levels of proficiency should be targeted less heavily 
than those with shorter learning curves. 
The main driving factor behind force reductions is financial resources.  Thus, the 
end goal for force reductions is to save money.  Ideally, the present value of the offers 
should not exceed the present value of the expected retirement annuities and benefits.  If 
the present value of the expected retirement annuities and benefits exceeds the present 
value of the offer, then the plan is not fiscally responsible, and should not be 
implemented.  The amount of the offer need only be high enough to produce the desired 
number of separations.  A very lucrative offer would cause too many personnel to want to 
separate.  Since they all would not be able to separate, morale would suffer.  An offer that 
is too low would not achieve the desired goals.  
 
C. CRITERIA AFFECTING INDIVIDUAL DECISIONS 
1. Financial Compensation 
All individuals targeted must decide between accepting a separation offer and 
continuing in the military with some expectation of reaching retirement.  A key factor 
involved in making this decision is comparing the present value of the income streams 
generated by each choice.  This decision is complicated because there are many 
unknowns associated with each choice.  When considering if they should remain in 
service, the member must consider the following: 
• The service member does not know if and when promotion will occur.  
• The service member does not know if HYT will change.  
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• Bonuses and incentive pays that may currently exist are not guaranteed to 
be available in the future.  
When considering if they should leave the service, the following items should be 
theorized: 
• How long will it take to find employment? 
• Does the service member possess the training, background, or education 
necessary to find a job that will pay at least as much as they are currently 
making? 
• What is the likelihood of being laid off? 
• What are the requirements for retirement? 
• What are the retirement benefits? 
 
2. Benefits 
Benefits are an important part of the military compensation and retirement 
package. Different people value benefits differently.  Generally, younger service 
members without dependants, value benefits less than older members with dependants.  
 
3. Non-financial Considerations 
A price tag cannot be put on all benefits.  Some members join the military out of 
patriotism, or because it is a family tradition.  It is very hard to quantify the call to duty 
that motivates some service members.  The sense of patriotism, though shared by many, 
varies from member to member.  Consequently, A more generous financial package 
would be needed for some to seriously consider voluntarily separating.  
 
D. SEPARATION PAY PROGRAMS 
1. VSI/SSB 
a. Background 
In July of 1991, DOD submitted a bill to congress requesting authorization 
for the Voluntary Separation Incentive (VSI). DOD’s proposal would have allowed 
separating members that did not want to receive their separation benefits in annuity form 
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to sell their annuities in the private market [Ref. 12:p. 35].  Congress refused to approve 
this bill as written and an impasse prevailed for several months.  Congress later added a 
provision in the FY 1992 Defense Authorization Act allowing separating members to 
take a lump sum payment for involuntary separation in lieu of the annuity proposed by 
DOD.  This lump sum option was titled Selective Separation Benefit (SSB). Personnel 
who took the lump sum were also to receive all other separation benefits available to 
involuntary separating members.  The act also adopted DOD’s VSI proposal along with 
DOD’s conditions relating to other benefits available to VSI recipients.   
 
b. Eligibility 
The VSI and SSB programs became effective on January 1, 1992. 
Eligibility requirements are described below. 
1. Member has served on active duty for more than 6 years before December 5, 1991 
and has completed his initial term of enlistment or initial period of obligated 
service prior to separation; 
2. Member has served at least 5 years of continuous active duty immediately 
preceding the date of separation; 
3. Upon separation, member is not immediately eligible for retired or retainer pay 
based on military service; 
4. Member is serving on active duty, or, if a reservist, is on the active duty list; and 
5. Member fulfills any other criteria, as established by the individual services, such 
as years of service, skill or rating, grade or rank and remaining period of obligated 
service [Ref. 13:pp. 6-59, 6-60]. 
Service members who met all of the eligibility requirements could 
voluntarily request separation under the VSI or SSB programs. Eligibility did not 
guarantee approval. Applications could be rejected if readiness became an issue. Service 
members who were approved had to separate from the military before Congressional 





Service members who were approved to separate under the VSI program 
were paid an amount equal to 2.5 percent of their final monthly basic pay, multiplied by 
12 and multiplied again by the number of years of service. Thus the formula for the 
annual payment is as follows: 
Annual VSI Payment = 2.5% x final monthly basic pay x 12 months x YOS 
Service members who were approved to separate under the SSB were paid 
a lump sum equal to 15 percent of their final monthly basic pay, multiplied by 12 and 
multiplied again by the number of years of service.  Thus the formula for the lump sum is 
as follows: 
Lump Sum Payment = 15% x final monthly basic pay x 12 months x YOS 
Approved VSI service members were paid in annual installments 
commencing on their departure from active duty, and on each anniversary date thereafter.  
The total number of payments equals twice the number YOS, provided the member 
continued to serve in the Naval Reserve for the duration of the payments. Table 2 
compares cash benefits of the two programs. 
 
VSI SSB Grade YOS 
Amount Years Total Amount 
E5 7  $   2,776 14  $     38,864  $ 16,655 
E5 10  $   4,290 20  $     85,800  $ 25,742 
E6 12  $   5,925 24  $   142,200  $ 35,549 
E6 14  $   7,129 28  $   199,612  $ 42,774 
E7 15  $   8,536 30  $   256,080  $ 51,216 
O3 7  $   5,785 14  $     80,990  $ 34,709 
O3 9  $   7,703 18  $   138,654  $ 46,219 
O4 12  $ 12,001 24  $   288,024  $ 72,006 
O4 14  $ 14,640 28  $   409,920  $ 87,840 
 
Table 2.   VSI Versus SSB Benefits1 
 
 
                                                 
1 Calculations based on FY 1992 Basic Pay Schedule 
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A list of non-financial benefits is included below2 [Ref. 14]: 
• Pre-separation Counseling (spouse also eligible) 
• Development of Transition Plan (spouse also eligible) 
• Career Change Counseling (spouse also eligible) 
• Transition health care for 120 days after separation 
• 18 months pre-existing condition coverage if using DOD sponsored health 
insurance 
• Unlimited Commissary, Exchange, and Morale, Welfare & Recreation (MWR) 
privileges for 2 years after separation for service member and family 
• 1-year free furniture storage 
• Verification of Military Training and Experience Document (DD Form 2586) 
• Application for the Evaluation of Military Learning Experiences (DD Form 295) 
• Participation in Departments of Labor and Veteran’s Affairs Transition 
Workshops (TAP&DTAP) (spouse also eligible) 
• Enrollment in the Defense Outplacement Referral System (DORS) and Public 
and Community Service (PACS) (spouse also eligible) 
• Use of the Transition Bulletin Board (TBB) (spouse also eligible) 
• Other Employment Assistance Programs (spouse also eligible) 
• One time employment preference for Non-appropriated Fund (NAF) positions 
(spouse also eligible) 
• Relocation assistance (spouse also eligible) 
• Financial Planning Assistance (available to spouse as appropriate) 
• Unemployment Compensation (eligibility varies by state) 
• Use of America's Job Bank (spouse also eligible) 
• Veteran’s Benefits  
• Increased household goods storage 
• Home of Selection move  
• 180 day extension in Military Family housing on a space available basis 
                                                 
2 Originally, the VSI plan included no transitional benefits. This was changed in a 
later revision. 
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• Montgomery GI Bill Enrollment or VEAP Conversion 
• Troops to Teacher Program 
• Priority in affiliation with Guard and Reserve  




Members who were entitled to VSI payments and who subsequently 
received basic pay, compensation for inactive duty training, or disability compensation 
forfeited an equal amount of the VSI pay.  Members entitled to receive VSI pay that 
subsequently qualified for retired pay or retainer pay faced a deduction of retired or 
retainer pay equal to the VSI received. VSI annual payments were discontinued if the 
member separated from the Naval Reserve, unless one of the two following conditions 
was met: 
1. In the event of the service member’s death, full VSI annual payments continued to 
the service member’s beneficiaries; 
2. In the event that the service member became ineligible to continue to serve in the 
Naval Reserve due to medical reasons, age, failure to select for promotion, or 
other reasons determined to be no fault of the member concerned, the member 
was transferred to the Standby Reserves or the Retired reserve of the Naval 
Reserve. The service member continued to receive annual VSI payments for the 
remaining authorized period. 
Service members who were approved for SSB entered into a written 
agreement with the Secretary of the Navy to serve in the Naval Reserve for a period of 
not less than three years following their separation from active duty.  If the service 
member had a service obligation that was not completed at the time that the member 
separated from active duty, the 3-year obligation began on the day after the original 
service obligation. 
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Regular enlisted members eligible for SSB submitted their requests for 
separation under this program before the expiration of their term of enlistment or, upon 
discharge, entered into a written agreement not to request reenlistment in a regular 
component.  Members of the Navy, other than regular members, who were eligible for 
SSB had to submit their requests for separation under this program before the expiration 




In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1992, Congress 
enacted the Temporary Early Retirement Act (TERA), which permitted selected military 
members to retire early and accrue additional military retirements credits if they gained 
employment with qualifying public or community service organizations.  More 
specifically, the TERA measure contained the following provisions:  
• Section 4403(a) gave each of the Armed Services the ‘temporary early retirement 
authority’ (TERA), to offer retirement at 15 years to 20 years of service.  
• Section 4403(c) added the caveat that those members accepting early retirement 
had to register under Section 4462(a). Completing a DD Form 2580 at the time of 
retirement does this. Section 4403(c) states that retirees will receive information 
about Public and Community Services (PACS) job opportunities.  
• Section 4464(a) provides that a Service member electing early retirement may 
accrue additional retirement credit if employed in public or community service 
between the time of retirement and the time the retiree would have attained 20 
years of military service. The early retiree will have his or her military retired pay 
increased at age 62.  
• Section 4462(c) states that the public or community service organization 
employing the retiree must be designated a qualifying organization and be on the 
Department of Defense’s Public and Community Service Organization Registry.  
 20
The Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) under the banner of Operation 
Transition maintains this registry [Ref. 15].  
 
b. Benefits 
An early retirement entitles the individual to all of the normal retirement 
benefits of a person retiring with twenty or more years, except that retirement pay is 
reduced. 
c. Implementation 
The law provides that TERA retirees accrue military retirement credit 
during their "enhanced retirement qualification period" if they are employed in public or 
community service.  In other words, TERA retirees have the opportunity of accumulating 
additional YOS, although not in military uniform and, at age 62, having their military 
retirement pay increased accordingly.  
The TERA retiree can accrue additional retirement credit only during the 
enhanced retirement qualification period.  Specifically, this period is from the date of 
retirement to the date on which the retiree would have attained 20 years of creditable 
service for the purposes of computing retired pay.  
Creditable service is a combination of several key elements of military 
service.  The building blocks of retired pay and length of service calculations are:  
• total years, months, and days of active service  
• years of service for base pay - a combination of active and inactive service  
• years of service for retirement - based on active service  
• the reduction factor applied to early retirees - based on active service  
• the service percent multiplier, based on active and inactive service ("Section 1405 
time"), used to determine when a retiree would have attained twenty years.  
Because the service percent multiplier combines these types of service into 
years, months, and days, the addition of "Section 1405 time" can create an enhanced 
retirement qualification ending date that is different than an ending date based solely on 
total active service.  In "Section 1405 time" cases, the multiplier calculation to fix the 
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ending date will preclude an early retiree from reaching a full twenty years of active 
service by earning additional time working in public service.  
For example, an individual with a retirement date of January 1, 1995, with 
15 years 6 months and 10 days of total active service, and no other service time, has 15 
years for retirement eligibility and 15 years for retired pay.  His enhanced retirement 
qualification period (ERQP) is 4 years 5 months and 20 days.  In this example, his service 
percent multiplier is 150610, and is used to calculate his twenty year date: a calendar date 
4 years 5 months and 20 days following the date of his military retirement.  Should this 
retiree work in public service from the date of his retirement to his twenty-year date, he 
will achieve full retirement with no reduction factor at age 62 (see Table 3) [Ref. 15].  
Total active service Years Months Days
20 years for calculations 19 11 30
minus early retirement from actice service 15 6 10
equals ERQP 4 5 20
plus retirement date 1995 1 1
equals twenty year date 1999 6 21
 
Table 3.   TERA Retirement Calculation Table [From: Ref. 15] 
 
 
E. VOLUNTARY SEPARATION COSTS 
The costs of separating offers will be a major determinant of their desirability and 
use by the services.  There are several cost issues.  First, accepted separation offers often 
replace future retirement payments and thus reduce the future military retirement liability.  
Any reasonable plan for early separation will result in net government savings.  However; 
the separation outlays will probably occur before the savings from reduced retirement 
expenditures are realized.  
Separation payments in the form of annuities will have less immediate budgetary 
effects than lump-sum payments.  The line items that compose the DODs separation pay 
account are as follows: 
• terminal leave pay; 
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• lump-sum readjustment pay; 
• donations; 
• severance pay, disability; 
• severance pay, non-promotion; 
• severance pay, involuntary half (5 percent); 
• severance pay, involuntary full (10 percent); 
• severance pay, voluntary separation incentive; 
• severance pay, special separation benefits; and, 
• severance pay, 15-year retirement. 
 
Table 4 summarizes the Navy’s total separation pay in FY 1990-97  
(millions of $). 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Amount 150$    194$    331$    407$    405$    329$    317$    192$       
Share of DOD total 27.40% 25.50% 11.90% 15.50% 27.20% 20.40% 25.60% 20.20%  




In FY 1992 4,527 sailors separated or retired as a result of Force Reduction 
programs.  Those taking SSB totaled 3,555. Navy personnel opting for the VSI numbered 
622.  Until the summer, the two early separation programs were only offered to enlisted 
personnel in skills that were excessively manned. Officers were not eligible for SSB or 
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III. RETIREMENT PLANS 
A. RETIREMENT STRUCTURE 
A Navy or Marine Corps member is considered to be a retired member for 
classification purposes if he or she is an enlisted member, or a warrant or commissioned 
officer with over 30 years service.  Enlisted Navy and Marine Corps members with less 
than 30 years service are transferred to the Fleet Reserve/Fleet Marine Corps Reserve and 
their pay is referred to as “retainer pay”.  When a Navy or Marine Corps member 
completes 30 years, including time on the retired rolls in receipt of retainer pay, the Fleet 
Reserve status is changed to retired status.  There are actually three different retirement 
systems currently in effect, depending on the service member’s date of initial entry into 
military service (DIEMS).  Retired pay amounts are determined by multiplying the 
service factor (normally referred to as the “multiplier”) by the active duty base pay at the 
time of retirement.   
1. Final Pay Plan 
The “Final Pay” plan was the original post-WWII military retirement plan that 
passed with the Military Reform Act of 1936.  The “Final Pay” plan applies to anyone 
initially entering the military prior to September 8, 1980.  Individuals receive a multiplier 
of their monthly base pay, 50% (0.50) if they retire at 20 years of service.  The 
percentage increases at a rate of 2.5% per year for each year over 20 that an individual 
remains on active duty up to 30 years; this means a retiree would get 75% of base pay 
after 30 years of service.  All military retirees receive an automatic annual cost of living 
increase each year equal to the consumer price index (CPI). 
2.  High Three Plan 
The “High-Three” modification to the “Final Pay” plan applies to anyone who 
initially came on active duty on or after September 8, 1980.  Furthermore, those who 
came on active duty on or before July 31, 1986 are covered only by this plan; they do not 
have the option of choosing the Career Service Bonus that will be discussed later.  Most 
service members currently at or approaching retirement eligibility are covered by the 
“High Three” retirement plan.  The only change from the final pay plan is that retirement 
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pay is based on the individual’s high three average pay instead of final pay.  This 
represents a light-to moderate reduction in total retirement benefits, depending on the 
individual’s circumstances. 
3.  CSB/REDUX Plan 
“REDUX” was originally passed as part of the Military Retirement Reform Act of 
1986.  It applied to anyone entering active duty on or after August 1, 1986.  The REDUX 
retirement system and Career Status Bonus (CSB) is a package deal. Those who elect this 
option receive a $30,000 bonus, but must remain on active duty until 20 years or pay 
back a portion of the bonus (20% for each year prior to 20 that they fail to complete).  
Additionally, those who elect this option have their multiplier reduced to 40% at twenty 
years of service.  The bonus is fully taxable; for members in the 15% tax bracket, this 
means they will net $25,500 if they take the bonus in cash.  Most military members 
(those above E-6, or most with working spouses) are in the 27% bracket, leaving a net of 
$21,900. 
This choice is a one time, binding decision, to be made between the 14½ and 15-
year point.  Each member who entered service on or after August 1, 1986 will receive a 
notification on this matter at approximately his or her 14½ year point.  They then have 
the opportunity to make the CSB/REDUX election.  They can make this election at any 
time within those 6 months after being notified or up to the day they hit 15 years, 
whichever is later. If they change their minds, they can withdraw the request.  However, 
on the day they hit 15 years, the decision becomes binding, and they are locked in for life.  
If they chose REDUX, they will be paid the $30,000 CSB “no later than the first month 
that begins on or after the day that is 60 days after the date the election is effective.” 
a.  Advantages 
There is an advantage in taking the Career Service Bonus – immediate 
cash, to use in any manner the service member wishes.  This could be for an investment, 
for seed capital to start a second career business, for education, or (less wisely) to repay 
debts or even to purchase a new car.  Each of these opportunities has limitations. 
The best potential use for the bonus would be for investment.  However, the 
bonus money would have to be invested relatively aggressively to even come 
• 
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close to providing the difference in retirement pay.  Most reputable financial 
planners will use between 10% and 11% as the maximum long-term growth rate 
that can be expected from a diversified all-stock portfolio for even an experienced 
investor.  Higher returns can be achieved only by taking on a level of risk that is 
well above average.  Even at 11%, most retirees with less than 25 years on active 
duty will come up short under the “REDUX plus Bonus” plan [Ref. 17]. 
Some individuals may wish to use the bonus to pay for education expenses for 
themselves, their spouses, or their children.  In most cases, there is a possibility of 





Debt repayment:  Some service members may have a large amount of consumer 
debt at an unattractive interest rate.  Even here, however, there are usually better 
options, ones that do not involve mortgaging the family’s long-term future. 
Finally, despite the best of intentions, there will always be a strong temptation to 
spend at least part of the bonus.  This would probably represent the least wise use 
of the bonus money. 
 
b.  Disadvantages 
There are also substantial disadvantages to taking the CSB.  The main 
disadvantage is a major, permanent reduction in retired pay.  This also means a reduction 
in survivor benefits for a surviving spouse.  Perhaps the greatest risk is the risk that an 
individual may spend some, most, or even the entire bonus, leaving very little to show for 
it.  The best way to look at the CSB may not be as a bonus, but rather as a loan - a 
relatively high interest loan against future military retirement, to be repaid out of each 
and every retired check for the remainder of member’s lifetime. 
 REDUX was originally passed as part of the Military Retirement Reform 
Act of 1986.  It applied to anyone entering active duty on or after August 1, 1986.  There 
were some significant, and very negative, changes made.  First, the multiplier was 
reduced for anyone retiring with less than 30 years of service; it was cut to 40% for those 
retiring at 20.  The multiplier is increased at 3.5% for each additional year of service; the 
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longer a service member stays in, the smaller the overall reduction under this plan.  The 
second big change was that all annual cost of living raises are based on the consumer 
price index (CPI) minus 1% each year, instead of a full cost of living adjustment 
(COLA). 
 Effective October 1, 1999, the Military Retirement Act of 1986 (REDUX) 
was repealed by the National Defense Authorization Act of 1999.  The major change 
under this act was a restoration, for military service members who entered military 
service after July 31, 1986, of the 50% of the high three years average basic pay for 20 
years of active duty service, rather than 40% under REDUX.  Also, it provided for full 
COLA rather than the Consumer Price Index (CPI) minus one percentage point under 
REDUX.  Additionally, these service members have the alternative or option of receiving 
a $30,000 retention bonus in return for remaining under REDUX and serve on active duty 
for a period of 20 years. 
 
B.  REDUX VS. HIGH THREE 
With the “REDUX” calculation, there are two major changes from the high three 
plan.  First is the reduced multiplier.  Second, and perhaps more significant, is the cost of 
living reduction:  1% less per year, every year, although there is a one-time “catch up” 
feature.  At age 62, the individual’s retirement check is increased up to what he or she 
would have received (including full COLA increases) – for one year.  After that, the 1% 
less-per-year feature starts again.  All this represents a significant reduction in benefits – 
up to a 25% loss (over $250,000 in lifetime retired pay) for anyone retiring with between 




Multiplier % Years of 
Service High 3 REDUX
20 50 40 
21 52.5 43.5 
22 55 47 
23 57.5 50.5 
24 60 54 
25 62.5 57.5 
26 65 61 
27 67.5 64.5 
28 70 68 
29 72.5 71.5 
30 75 75 




C.  RETIREMENT PLAN CHOICE 
Under provisions of the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act, all service 
members who came on active duty on or after August 1, 1986 are now back under the 
“High Three” Retirement Plan.  However, when they reach 15 years of service, they get a 
choice: 
They can remain under the “High Three” Plan • 
• 
or 
They can elect instead to have their retired pay calculated under the newer, less 
generous “REDUX” formula– and, also receive a one-time, lump sum $30,000 
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IV. METHODOLOGY 
A. DESCRIPTION OF DATA 
The Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) provided the data sets used in this 
thesis.  The data sets showed the end strength numbers for the DOD during the years that 
VSI, SSB, and TERA were active programs.  The data set also shows how many people 
separated under each program.  Also, the data provided the paygrade and total years of 
service for each person that separated under these programs.  These data were used to 
calculate the financial savings to the DOD when compared to full retirement.  The 
column and the row with the highest totals were used for analysis. Their point of 
intersection was used for calculations.  For example, in FY 92, there were 2242 O3s and 
881 service members with 12 YOS.  As a result, O3 with 12 YOS was used for 
 
calculations (see Table 6). 
Table 6.   FY 92 VSI Takers 
For the calculations in this chapter, the comparison is made between two options.  
The fir
Under 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 Tot
E3 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
E4 39 6 37 55 68 31 24 11 3 9 1 4 3 3 0 29
E5 7 4 7 19 123 196 233 324 295 264 168 96 54 23 13 1826
E6 1 0 0 1 13 64 77 108 135 181 179 126 96 48 14 1043
E7 0 0 0 1 0 1 3 7 19 30 48 64 70 59 20 322
E8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 3 1
E9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
W2 1 0 0 0 0 2 3 4 1 3 8 10 5 0 3
W3 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 4 1 1 6 2 5
W4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
O2 0 0 1 4 7 5 4 2 2 2 1 1 0 0 0
O3 8 29 165 178 191 317 404 362 121 122 117 79 46 41 62 2242
O4 1 0 0 0 2 0 4 63 179 251 68 56 35 15 136 810
O5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 4 7 3












st option is to separate under the defined program.  The second option is to retire at 
twenty years of service.  According to the DOD Actuary, when retiring at twenty years of 
service, most officers retire at the rank of O4 (see Figure 2) and most enlisted personnel 
retire at the rank of E7 (see Figure 3) [Ref. 18]. This information formed the basis of the 
comparison. The next assumption is that the personnel who retired at twenty years of 
service did so under the “High Three” plan. It is reasonable to conclude that retiring 
personnel would choose this plan because they turned down the opportunity to leave the 
service under one of the separation programs.  The amount of pay that personnel would 
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receive between the time they could separate and the time they could retire was not 
included in this analysis because it is assumed that the government gets equal return on 
this investment.  Actual pay from the DOD pay tables [Appendix A] for the affected 
years were used in calculations except where noted.  The life expectancy used is from the 





































Figure 3.   Enlisted Se
B. EXPLANAT
al monthly basic pay x 12 months x 
YOS 
parations at 20 YOS 
 
ION OF CALCULATIONS 
• Annual VSI Payment = 2.5% x fin
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• Lump Sum SSB Payment = 15% x final monthly basic pay x 12 months x 
YOS 
• TERA Payment = 2 ½%  x  [1-([240-x]/1200)]  x  final pay 
where  x=number of months of active service (inflation adjusted, and paid 
 
• t three years of pay (inflation 
 
C. I FI
1. FY 1992 VSI Takers 
a. Assumptions 
 retirement 
• ice in 2000 under the “High Three” plan 
alculations based on O3 with 12 YOS 
VSI tot
s to OD 
over the lifetime of the service member) 
• TERA Payment (simplified) = DOD Actuary % [Appendix C]  x final pay 
Retirement Payment = 50% of highes
adjusted, and paid over the lifetime of the service member) 
• Discount rate used was based on 30-year interest rates on treasury notes 
and bonds [Ref. 20] 
• All calculations for chapter IV are included in Appendix D 
VS NANCIAL ANALYSIS 
• Promotion to 04 before
Retire with 20 years of serv
• 45 years old at retirement 




al  $136,339 
Retirement total $794,247 
Net saving  D $657,908 
 33
Net savings to DOD for all O3s with 12 YOS who left under VSI in FY 92 
.  FY 1993 VSI Takers 
 
 
a.  Assumptions 
• otion to 04 before retirement 
003 under the “High Three” plan 
 
b. Calculations 
Calculations based on O3 with 10 YOS 
t tot   
D 





Table 7.   FY 93 VSI Takers 
E6 0 0 0 7 30 38 39 38 63 111 76 67 37 22 50 578
E7 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 4 5 24 43 37 33 13 18 1
E8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 4 2
W2 0 0 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 5 0 1 2 0 0
W3 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 2 1 0 1 0
O2 0 0 1 1 2 2 5 1 1 3 1 0 0 0 0
O3 1 5 238 275 256 384 307 255 161 115 194 245 172 35 53 2696
O4 0 1 0 2 2 6 14 66 103 86 47 53 24 17 31 45
O5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 2
ALL 2 6 254 301 459 620 574 546 474 479 398 426 287 109 163 5098
Un 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 Total
E4 3 0 3 4 1 0 0 0 0 97








der 5 6 7 8 9 10
0 0 8 6 53 19
Prom
• Retire with 20 years of service in 2
• 45 years old at retirement 
• 84 years old at death 
VSI total  $93,570 
Retiremen al $913,972
Net savings to DO $819,602  





3.  FY 1994 VSI Takers 
Table 8.   FY 94 VSI Takers 
 
a.  Assu
• otion to 04 before retirement 
003 under the “High Three” plan 
b.  Calculations 
Calculations based on O3 with 11 YOS 
t tot  
D 
s with 11 YOS who left under VSI in FY 94 
 
E4 9 1 17 11 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
E5 3 1 0 29 28 38 96 83 61 19 8 12 11 5 3 39
E6 11 0 0 14 23 26 42 35 44 52 77 57 50 50 33 514
E7 12 0 0 0 0 2 3 8 10 24 18 27 15 28 22 16
E8 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 1 9 9
E9 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
W2 2 2 1 0 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 0 0 0 0
W3 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0
W4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
O1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
O2 6 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
O3 4 22 58 156 265 167 249 55 39 30 8 13 12 1 5 1084
O4 12 0 0 0 2 3 16 21 33 45 13 5 7 13 6 17
O5 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 3 6
O6 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ALL 91 27 76 210 320 238 408 203 189 174 125 123 100 110 84 2478
Un 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 Total














der 5 6 7 8 9 10
mptions 
Prom
• Retire with 20 years of service in 2
• 45 years old at retirement 
• 84 years old at death 
 
VSI total  $115,724 
Retiremen al $859,853 
Net savings to DO $744,129 





4.  FY 1995 VSI Takers 
Under 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 Tot
E1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
E3 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
E4 0 0 6 11 167 123 2 5 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 3
E5 4 0 0 6 175 345 199 142 147 103 14 3 8 1 1 1148
E6 11 0 0 2 4 9 16 17 64 56 26 26 31 14 14 29
E7 4 1 0 0 0 0 2 7 5 8 5 12 17 19 9
E8 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
W2 2 0 3 1 4 2 1 1 3 2 0 0 0 0 0
W3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 0 0 0
W4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
O2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
O3 19 39 129 211 287 204 284 49 32 21 2 6 4 1 11 1299
O4 11 0 0 4 1 6 8 9 20 22 8 5 3 2 4 1
O5 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 4 4
O6 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
















Table 9.   FY 95 VSI Takers 
 
a.  Assumptions 
• Promotion to 05 before retirement 
• Retire with 20 years of service in 2005 under the “High Three” plan 
• 45 years old at retirement 
• 84 years old at death 
 
b.  Calculations 
Calculations based on O3 with 10 YOS 
VSI total  $98,100 
Retirement total3 $914,457 
Net savings to DOD $816,357 






                                                 
3 Retirement calculations based on 2004 pay charts 
 5.  FY 1996 VSI Takers 
Under 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 Tot
E4 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
E5 1 0 0 0 2 5 1 2 4 2 0 0 0 0 0
E6 0 0 0 0 2 8 9 10 11 8 0 0 0 0 0
E7 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
W2 0 2 0 1 6 4 1 7 3 2 1 1 1 0 0
W3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
W4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
O1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
O2 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
O3 4 6 9 14 16 105 83 24 16 15 0 1 0 1 1 295
O4 6 0 0 1 2 0 2 1 1 0 2 1 0 0 0













Table 10.   FY 96 VSI Takers 
 
a.  Assumptions 
• Promotion to 04 before retirement 
• Retire with 20 years of service in 2006 under the “High Three” plan 
• 45 years old at retirement 
• 84 years old at death 
 
b.  Calculations 
Calculations based on O3 with 10 YOS 
VSI total  $100,470 
Retirement total4 $944,008 
Net savings to DOD $843,538 






                                                 
4 Ibid 
 6.   FY 1997 VSI Takers 
Under 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 Tot
E3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
E4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
E6 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
E7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
E8 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
W2 0 1 1 3 5 1 4 6 10 3 0 1 0 0 0
W3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
W4 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
O2 4 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
O3 1 7 6 4 7 125 63 17 23 13 2 3 0 1 0 272
O4 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 4 2 0 1 0 0 0
O5 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
O6 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0















Table 11.   FY 97 VSI Takers 
 
a.  Assumptions 
• Promotion to 04 before retirement 
• Retire with 20 years of service in 2007 under the “High Three” plan 
• 45 years old at retirement 
• 84 years old at death 
 
b.  Calculations 
Calculations based on O3 with 10 YOS 
VSI total  $100,470 
Retirement total5 $857,805 
Net savings to DOD $757,335 





                                                 
5 Ibid 
 D.  SSB FINANCIAL ANALYSIS 
1.  FY 1992 SSB Takers 
Under 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 To
E1 2 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 1
E3 28 0 30 16 8 5 4 4 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
E4 100 100 1731 2866 2581 900 527 301 82 42 45 30 14 22 6 9347
E5 38 32 134 776 3103 4282 3915 4162 3341 2131 1253 684 316 151 84 24402
E6 5 4 4 11 218 843 837 923 906 951 816 555 346 187 103 6709
E7 0 0 0 0 1 14 23 59 93 151 212 200 189 156 83 11
E8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 3 3
W2 1 3 8 11 12 18 10 10 11 16 20 9 3 6 11 1
W3 0 0 0 0 1 0 7 7 3 4 3 6 3 3 3
W4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
O1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
O2 4 2 9 17 9 8 6 5 2 3 1 4 1 2 1
O3 6 173 528 463 331 447 441 382 116 126 88 68 49 43 63 3324
O4 0 0 1 0 0 2 4 46 108 114 43 29 15 8 58 4
O5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 3 6











Table 12.   FY 92 SSB Takers 
 
a.  Assumptions 
• Promotion to E7 before retirement 
• Retire with 20 years of service in 2002 under the “High Three” plan 
• 40 years old at retirement 
• 80 years old at death 
 
b.  Calculations 
Calculations based on E5 with 10 YOS 
SSB total  $25,740 
Retirement total $519,076 
Net savings to DOD $493,336 






 2.  FY 1993 SSB Takers 
Table 13.   FY 93 SSB Takers 
 
a.  Ass
• otion to E7 before retirement 
04 under the “High Three” plan 
 
b.  Calculations 
Calculations based on E5 with 9 YOS 
 tota   
D 
s with 9 YOS who left under SSB in FY 93 
Under 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 To
E3 1 0 5 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 9
E4 22 13 1510 562 830 139 42 12 20 35 4 3 2 1 0 31
E5 5 5 187 487 1915 1612 1478 990 803 551 173 93 57 53 20 8429
E6 0 0 9 160 403 330 283 386 401 338 303 195 115 42 83 3048
E7 0 0 0 0 1 2 8 18 36 81 81 78 57 41 26 4
W1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
W2 3 2 5 6 8 3 12 5 9 9 5 3 4 4 0
W3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 5
O2 4 0 1 7 5 2 1 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0
O3 6 4 510 471 381 289 206 119 59 65 222 171 82 37 42 2664
O4 0 0 1 0 3 2 7 35 41 35 21 12 9 7 13 1
O5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2
O6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
O9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1










• Retire with 20 years of service in 20
• 40 years old at retirement 
• 80 years old at death 
SSB total  $23,117 
Retirement l $564,493
Net savings to DO $541,376 







3.  FY 1994 SSB Takers 
FY 94 SSB Takers 
 
a.  Assumptions 
• Promotion 
• re w f service in 2003 under the “High Three” plan 
• 40 years old at retirement 
• 80 years old at death 
 
Calculations based on E5 with 11 YOS 
SSB to 7 
Retirement total $505,486 
Net savings to DOD $475,470 





E3 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
E4 25 8 867 561 7 5 1 4 3 1 1 0 1 1 1 14
E5 53 5 28 458 322 950 1224 936 735 246 70 86 78 44 20 5255
E6 38 0 2 148 205 191 188 183 165 163 166 115 90 99 80 1833
E7 29 0 0 0 1 2 5 20 53 51 42 37 42 46 49 377
E8 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 6 2 9 5 8
E9 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
W2 4 16 14 12 13 10 8 6 7 2 2 1 0 0 0
W3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
W4 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
O2 0 2 1 1 2 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
O3 5 82 155 304 369 140 148 35 24 16 11 13 5 0 2 1309
O4 13 0 0 0 2 2 8 8 14 16 9 4 4 8 3
O5 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 2 3
O6 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ALL 189 113 1069 1484 921 1300 1582 1194 1005 496 308 259 229 205 169 10523
Under 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 Total












Table 14.   
to E7 before retirement 
Reti ith 20 years o





 4.  FY 1995 SSB Takers 
a.  Assumptions 
• Promotion 
• re w f service in 2006 under the “High Three” plan 
Calculations based on E5 with 9 YOS 
SSB to 5 
s to OD  
ith 9 YOS who left under SSB in FY 95 
 
 
                                                
 
Table 15.   FY 95 SSB Takers 
 
E8 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 4 4
W2 5 13 16 8 15 10 3 7 4 2 2 0 0 1 1
W4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
O2 3 0 0 0 2 0 1 3 1 0 1 0 1 1 0
O3 13 150 222 288 309 138 135 31 18 16 5 6 5 1 5 1342
O4 9 1 0 0 1 7 7 3 11 4 8 5 0 2 0
O5 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
ALL 114 177 475 553 3530 2951 1112 694 798 548 371 299 260 199 106 12187
Under 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 Total
E3 2 0 3 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8
E4 11 21 11 6 8 7 3 1 0 0 2912
E5 859 554 490 273 98 50 28 16 2 5888
E6 75 73 258 229 193 163 137 92 47 1450







11 226 174 1605 828
26 1 7 70 1527 1887
26 1 1 13 69 73
to E7 before retirement 
Reti ith 20 years o
• 40 years old at retirement 
• 80 years old at death 
 
b.  Calculations 
tal  $24,23
Retirement total6 $544,663 
Net saving D $521,428






 5.  FY 1996 SSB Takers 
a.  Assumptions 
• Promotion 
• re w f service in 2006 under the “High Three” plan 
alculations based on O3 with 10 YOS 
SSB to 2 
s to OD  
th 10 YOS who left under SSB in FY 96 
                                                
 
Table 16.   FY 96 SSB Takers 
 
W3 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0
W4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
O2 1 1 0 3 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
O3 2 23 24 21 13 97 44 12 11 9 0 1 1 1 0 25
O4 2 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 2 1 0 2 0 0
O5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
ALL 11 36 31 33 49 156 82 59 57 29 3 6 5 1 0 558
Under 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 Total
E 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
E 2 1 0 0 10 36 17 16 12 3 0 0 0 0 0 97
E6 0 11 22 24 12 2 3 0 0 0 90
E7 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 3









2 0 0 3 11
1 0 0 0 0 0
to O4 before retirement 
Reti ith 20 years o
• 45 years old at retirement 
• 84 years old at death 
 
b.  Calculations 
C
tal  $60,28
Retirement total7 $944,008 
Net saving D $883,726








 6.  FY 1997 SSB Takers 
 
a.  Assumptions 
• Promotion 
• re w f service in 2007 under the “High Three” plan 
• 
Calculations based on O3 with 10 YOS 
SSB to 2 
s to OD  
th 10 YOS who left under SSB in FY 97 
                                                
 
FY 97 SSB Takers 
W2 1 1 3 1 9 5 6 5 6 2 0 1 0 0 0
W3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
O2 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
O3 1 16 26 14 18 81 43 10 17 3 2 0 1 0 0 23
O4 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 2 1 1 0 0 0
O5 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
O6 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
ALL 7 18 29 15 28 87 50 19 26 8 3 2 1 0 1 294
Under 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 Total
E4 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3








Table 17.   
to O4 before retirement 
Reti ith 20 years o
• 45 years old at retirement 
84 years old at death 
 
b.  Calculations 
tal  $62,08
Retirement total8 $857,805 
Net saving D $795,723









 E.  ERA FINANCIAL ANALYSIS 
1.  FY 1992 TERA Takers 
 
• Promotion to O4 before retirement 
• Retire with 20 years of service in 1995 under the “High Three” plan 
• ear ent 




 with 17 YOS who left under TERA in FY 92 
T
Table 18.   FY 92 TERA Takers 
 
a.  Assumptions 
45 y s old at retirem
b.  Calculations 
Ca tions based on O3 with 17 
TERA total  $442,5
ent total $674,9
Net savings to DOD $232,310 




0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 5 3 5 3
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 17 22 34 24 13 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 13 32 37 18 1
E8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 6
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 5 14 9 1
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 4 2
W4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 1 0 4
O3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 30 28 30 3 0
O4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 10 17 16 17
O5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2
O6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
ALL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 74 88 134 100 62 4  
Under 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
















Table 19.   FY 93 TERA Takers 
Und 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 Total
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
er 5
O3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0





2.  FY 1993 TERA Takers 
a.  Assumptions 
• Promotion to E7 before retirement 
• Retire with 20 years of service in 1996 under the “High Three” plan 
• 40 years old at retireme
• 80 years old at death 
 
b.  Calculations 
Calculations based on E6 with 17 YOS 
TERA total  $253,121 
Retirement total $382,017 
Net savings to DOD $128,896 
Net savings to DOD for all E6s with 17 YOS who left under TERA in FY 93 
$4,382,475 
 
Table 20.   FY 94 TERA Takers 
 
nt 
3.  FY 1994 TERA Takers 
 
Under 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 To
E1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
E3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 6
E4 0 0 0 0 3 5 4 14 18
E5 0 0 0 0 611 603 569 467 288 25
E6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 371 371 560 1074 734 31
E7
E8
E9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 1 6 6 15
W2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 12 30 22 16
W3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 8 17 13 13
W4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 5 3 3
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 3
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 77 61 72 58 50 3
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 309 587 788 681 590 29
O5 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 28 31 38 37 40 1
O6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 5 1 7 5
ALL 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1562 1888 2593 3283 2654 119













0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 121 171 421 773 740 2226









• Promotion to E7 before retirement 
• Retire with 20 years of service in 1999 under the “High Three” plan 
• 40 years old at retirement 
• 80 years old at death 
 
b.  Calculations 
Calculations based on E6 with 15 YOS 





4.  Y 1995 TERA Takers 






ent total $393,844 
ings to DOD $190,286 




0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 5 4 6 7 35
 
Under 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 To
E3 0 0 1 1 1 0 2 5
E4 0 0 10 6 4 5 5
E5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1817 574 481 347 162 33
E6 0 0 0 0 0 0 2014 2005 2293 1997 996 93
E7 0 0 0 0 0 0 813 1008 1320 1519 976 56
E8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 53 54 67 118 74 3
E9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 4 0 6 4
W2 0 0 0 0 0 6 7 23 10 11
W3 0 0 0 0 0 6 5 15 6 4
W4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 0 5 3
O2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
O3 0 0 0 0 120 131 108 92 81 5
O4 0 0 0 0 407 574 379 382 179 19















0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
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a.  Assumptions 
• Promotion to E7 before retirement 
• Retire with 20 years of service in 2000 under the “High Three” plan 
• 40 years old at retirement 
• 80 years old at death 
 
b.  Calculations 
Calcula ons base
TERA total  $214,357 
Retirem $423,735 
Net savings to DOD $209,378 
Net sav s to E6s with 15 YOS who left under TERA in FY 95 
 
Table 22.   FY 96 TERA Takers 
 
 
ti d on E6 with 15 YOS 
ent total 
ing  DOD for all 
$421,687,864 
 
5. FY 1996 TERA Takers 
 
Un 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 To
E1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2
E4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 2 3 9
E5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 630 128 158 185 90 11
E6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 741 407 653 715 389 29
E7 0 0 0 0 0 0 177 118 320 384 290 12
E8 0 0 0 0 0 0 36 28 17 31 30 1
E9 0 0 17 3 4 6 3
W2 0 0 15 10 11 16 16
W3 0 0 10 9 4 3 0
W4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 4 4 1
O2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2
O3 0 0 0 0 0 0 114 70 66 73 50 3
O4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 406 605 433 205 150 17
O5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 54 33 45 88 74 2
O6 0 0 0 0 0 8 13 7 5 3
ALL 0 0 0 0 0 2213 1428 1723 1718 1100 81
der 5 6 7 8 9 10

















0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0





alculations based on E6 with 17 YOS 
ERA total  $270,893 
etirement total $417,639 
et savings to DOD $146,746 
Net sav s to E6s with 17 YOS who left under TERA in FY 96 
 
Table 23.   FY 97 TERA Takers 
 
 
a.  Assumptions 
• Promotion to E7 before retirement 
• Retire with 20 years of service in 1999 under the “High Three” plan 
• 40 years old at retirement 






ing  DOD for all 
$95,825,320 
 
6. FY 1997 TERA Takers 
 
Un 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 Total
E4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2
E5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 196 53 51 57 27 384
E6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 416 385 344 251 132 1528
E7 0 0 0 0 0 0 190 299 284 336 196 1305
E8 0 0 0 0 0 0 38 24 12 21 27 122
E9 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 6 2 2 2 16
W1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2
W2 0 0 19 15 13 7 7 61
W3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 3 5 5 2 25
W4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 0 0 4
O2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2
O3 0 0 0 0 0 0 96 38 34 29 40 237
O4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 243 499 471 151 102 1466
O5 0 0 0 0 0 23 11 26 79 45 184
O6 0 0 0 0 0 11 5 3 6 2 27
ALL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1252 1339 1247 945 582 5365
der 5 6 7 8 9 10
0
0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
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a.  Assumptions 
• Promotion to E7 before retirement 
• Retire with 20 years of service in 2001 under the “High Three” plan 
• 40 years old at retirement 
• 80 years old at death 
 
b.  Calculations 
alculations based on E6 with 16 YOS 
TERA total  
Retirement total $421,003 
Net savings to DOD $185,566 













V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A.  CONCLUSIONS 
The calculations in Chapter IV represent the middle of the spectrum in terms of 
paygrade and years of service. While each case is an accurate representation of the 
specific year of the program, the range of savings is not evident.  A look at the extremes 
associated with the affected paygrade and YOS will illustrate this range of savings. For 
VSI in 1992, the subject used for calculations was an O3 with 12 YOS.  The range of 
YOS for all O3’s that separated for that year goes from under 5 to 19.  Similarly, the most 
junior personnel to separate in 1992 under VSI was an E4 and the most senior was an 04. 
The range of savings is summarized in the following tables. 
 
   
 






Base O3 12 657,908$         
O3 5 931,885$         
O3 19 293,289$         
YOS 
Range
Table 24.   FY 92 VSI Range 
E4 12 388,946$         




Base E5 10 493,336$         
E5 5 556,139$         
E5 19 223,772$         
E1 10 426,129$         








Table 26.   FY 94 TERA Range 
 
The goal for the separation programs was an end strength reduction of 400,000 
personnel [Ref 5].  It took over four years in order to reach this goal (see Table 27).   
Reduction from % Change from 
1992 611,305 541,921 184,590        470,315 1,808,131  
O6 15 284,276$         Range
Base E6 15 190,286$         
E6 15 190,286$         
E6 19 93,846$           






billion in separation costs ssociated with it at the time of 
paration than VSI. This is because of the large one time payment.  However, in the long 
n, the present value of SSB saved more money than VSI.  This long-term savings is 
hat the framers of these programs were aiming for, and it more than recouped the 
pfront costs of the lump-sum option. 
 It is estimated that the VSI/SSB program increased separation by 100 percent [Ref 
16: p. xii].  Therefore, about half of the eligible personnel who left with the VSI/SSB 
benefit would have left even without the program.  These personnel earned economic 
Fiscal Year Army Navy Marine Corps Air Force Total FY 1992 FY 1992
- -
1993 572,423 509,950 178,379        444,351 1,705,103  103,028            5.70%
1994 541,343 468,662 174,158        426,327 1,610,490  197,641            10.93%
1995 508,559 43 ,907 16.03%
1996 491,103 41 ,409 18.61%
1997 491,707 39 ,569 20.44%
1998 483,880 38 ,301 22.19%
1999 479,426 37 ,428 23.36%
2000 482,276 37 ,693 23.43%
2001 480,186 37 ,628 23.43%
 
Ta s 
In addition to trimming the force to the desired size, these programs conserved limited 
financial resources.  The separation programs offered over 65,000 personnel eligible for 
separation their choice of plans.  Even though the annuity option (VSI) always paid more 
to the separating individual, it was not taken as often as the lump-sum option (SSB). 
Most of the personnel selected the lump sum – saving taxpayers a present value of $1.7 
4,617 174,639        400,409 1,518,224  289            
6,735 174,883        389,001 1,471,722  336            
5,564 173,906        377,385 1,438,562  369            
2,338 173,142        367,470 1,406,830  401            
3,046 172,641        360,590 1,385,703  422            
3,187 173,321        355,654 1,384,438  423            
7,812 172,934        353,571 1,384,503  423            
ble 27.   Manpower Reduction






rents.  That is, they received compensation for separating, even though they would have 
separated anyway.  On the other hand, it is estimated that the other half of those who left 
were induced to leave by the program and would not have left without it.  This substantial 
effect suggests that DOD was able to design a successful voluntary separation incentive 
ay program [Ref. 16: :p. 36]  
 With retention at , again shape the force, there is 
deed a need for force shaping programs.  Figure 4 illustrates the likelihood of enlisted 
personn
future.  On the other hand, involuntary separations 
p
record highs  and the need to once 
in




Figure 4.   Likelihood of Staying for 20 Years [From Ref 17] 
 
Reinstatement of previous drawdown tools has been attempted (without success) over the 
last several years.  Additionally, authorities for the previous force shaping tools used 
during the drawdown expired several years ago.  While these tools served us well during 
the 1990’s, they are too inflexible, too costly, and ill-suited to the smaller-scale, targeted 
force shaping that is anticipated in the 
10




























(such as RIFs) are extremely costly in terms of negative morale and long-term retention.   
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The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is wary of the high cost of annuity 
payments used in the past and of the Services’ inability to articulate a long-term strategy 
for strength. 
 
B.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
A more “surgical” force-shaping tool is needed as the DOD seeks to become more 
fficien
efficient and more 
effective in accomplishing current and future missions. These programs should be 
targeted by service, skill, quantity, quality, and paygrade/length of service needed to 
permit officer and enlisted force shaping. Furthermore they should be efficient, 
minimizes economic rent, and maximize return on investment (ROI) to the DOD.  The 
desired program should also be market-based to achieve voluntary separations.  That is, it 
should be adjustable depending on retention conditions, skills targeted, number of 
separations desired, and other factors that would influence the decision to stay or 
separate. This would enable force-shaping efficiencies while retaining positive retention 
momentum of career force.  
e t and avoid any skill or experience imbalances in the smaller force.  Unlike 
previous tools, the desired flexible force-shaping tool is not to be strictly used for 
reducing the forces, but rather to shape them, making them more 
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